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Since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, bureaucrats and special interest groups have
been busy repackaging everything from peanut
subsidies to steel protectionism under the rubric
of “national security.” Federal law enforcement
agencies have also been expanding their power in
the name of combating terrorism, whether or not
such expansion has anything to do with enhanc-
ing security. One safeguard that exists to prevent
such abuse is congressional oversight, but too
many members of Congress are too often reluc-
tant to challenge law enforcement officials.  
For freedom to prevail in the age of terror-
ism, three things are essential. First, government
officials must take a sober look at the potential
risk and recognize that there is no reason to
panic and act rashly. 
Second, Congress must stop federal police agen-
cies from acting arbitrarily. Before imposing costly
and restrictive security measures that inconven-
ience thousands of people, police agencies ought to
be required to produce cost-benefit analyses. 
Third, government officials must demon-
strate courage rather than give in to their fears.
Radical Islamic terrorists are not the first enemy
that America has faced. British troops burned the
White House in 1814, the Japanese navy launched
a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Soviet
Union deployed hundreds of nuclear missiles
that targeted American cities. If policymakers are
serious about defending our freedom and our
way of life, they must wage this war without dis-
carding our traditional constitutional framework
of limited government.
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Introduction
“The Constitution of the United States
was written by 55 men—and one ghost,”
writes military historian Dave R. Palmer in
1794.1 This nation’s Founders were well
aware of the example of Oliver Cromwell,
who led the revolution that deposed King
Charles I and established civil government in
Great Britain. That democracy was short-
lived, because when the newly formed Rump
Parliament refused to meet Cromwell’s
demands, he used the army to seize power
and establish himself as Great Britain’s “Lord
Protector.” To America’s Founders, the les-
son was obvious: standing armies threaten
liberty. That explains why the Constitution
divided the power over the military between
the executive branch and the legislative
branch.
What America’s Founders did not foresee
was Congress allowing the president to con-
trol small armies of civilian police forces. The
Secret Service, the National Park Service, the
Transportation Security Administration, and
dozens of other executive agencies act solely at
the president’s behest. But instead of checking
the expansion of executive branch power,
members of Congress have virtually aban-
doned their critical oversight responsibilities. 
Although the growth of federal police
powers began before the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, the threat of terrorism is
now used to justify their reflexive expansion.
Restrictions on individual freedom go virtu-
ally unchallenged as long as they are charac-
terized as “security measures.” Cost-benefit
analyses are rarely, if ever, offered or required.
This paper will briefly examine the enhanced
powers of four federal police agencies and
will explain how those enhanced powers
threaten individual liberty.
National Park Police
Since the secretary of the interior reports
to the president, George W. Bush oversees the
United States Park Police, which means that
the president controls access to all national
parks and monuments. Historically, that
power has not been abused. But consider the
actions that the Bush administration has
taken over the last several years.
• After 9/11, Bush closed the Statue of
Liberty. Liberty Island reopened, but
people can no longer go inside the stat-
ue to overlook New York City and the
harbor. The statue that stands as a bea-
con of courage and freedom has now
been closed off because of fear. 
• Independence Hall in Philadelphia resem-
bles a minimum security prison facility.
To protest the metal barriers surrounding
the building where the Declaration of
Independence was adopted, local resident
Jake Browne placed a sign reading “Free
Independence Hall” on a park bench one
day as he ate his lunch. A park ranger told
Browne to remove his sign. “What about
my First Amendment right to free
speech?” Browne asked. “This is a First-
Amendment-free zone,” said the ranger,
directing Browne to an area two blocks
away. Not wanting to move, Browne
offered instead to turn his sign around.
“Fine,” said the ranger, “but if you turn it
back, you’re under arrest.”2
• Some Americans have simply given up
on plans to visit national parks and mon-
uments. While in Hawaii, Dan and Lisa
Holland of Meridian, Mississippi, took
their young sons to the Pearl Harbor
memorial. The family waited in line two
hours to get through security—only to be
handed timed tickets dictating another
two-hour wait. “And you couldn’t even
spend that time looking around,” Mrs.
Holland says, “because you couldn’t leave
the secured area.” The family outing they
had hoped to enjoy became a burden-
some ordeal.3
• In Washington, D.C., entrances to public
buildings are blocked by metal detectors
and armed guards. Drivers near the
Capitol can be stopped by police on city
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streets and their cars searched by bomb-
sniffing dogs. Visiting museums requires
waiting in long lines while backpacks and
pocketbooks are searched.4
• The Park Service has turned the Washing-
ton Monument into a surveillance tower,
placing cameras on its observation deck
that record activity on the National Mall
and beyond. After the Bush administra-
tion announced its plans to begin elec-
tronic surveillance of visitors to national
monuments, Rep. Constance Morella (R-
MD) called a hearing and asked for details.
“How long are they going to capture on
these cameras every face of every person
who is there? How long do they hold this
material? Who will have access to it?” she
asked John Parsons of the Park Service.
Parsons’s dismissive response was that it
would be used “only for valid law enforce-
ment purposes.”5
Surveillance cameras cannot prevent a ter-
rorist attack. If a suicide bomber walks into
the rotunda of the Jefferson Memorial with
explosives strapped to his body, a police offi-
cer watching at a remote site can do nothing
to prevent disaster. And what sort of imag-
ined threat is forestalled by fencing off the
rear of the Lincoln Memorial? Almost no one
goes behind the Lincoln Memorial, but the
fencing makes the monument an ugly site. 
Other measures are not only equally
pointless, but they are likely to be counter-
productive. Consider how the Park Police
fence off the National Mall before such
events as the Fourth of July festivities and
herd visitors in through checkpoints, which
the Park Police no longer pretend are purely
anti-terrorism measures. Park officials have
admitted that they search picnic baskets and
coolers for contraband—“alcoholic beverages,
glass bottles, fireworks.”6
The searches almost certainly yield noth-
ing but inconvenience. Determined scofflaws
will hide drugs in potato chip bags or pour
liquor into soda bottles. More important, if
something does go wrong, thousands of peo-
ple will be trapped in a confined space.
Subjecting Americans to police searches
before entering the National Mall protects no
one but may endanger many, and defies the
freedom the Mall is supposed to memorial-
ize. Yet the Park Police are rarely asked to jus-
tify their practices. And when they are asked
but refuse to account, they suffer no adverse
consequences. 
No one disputes that American land-
marks are prime terrorist targets. But what
the Bush administration ought to be exem-
plifying—and what its policies should
reflect—is a defiant refusal to be terrorized.
As Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) has put it: “Get
on the damn elevator! Fly on the damn
plane! Calculate the odds of being harmed by
a terrorist! It’s still about as likely as being
swept out to sea by a tidal wave. Suck it up,
for crying out loud. You’re almost certainly
going to be okay. And in the unlikely event
you’re not, do you really want to spend your
last days cowering behind plastic sheets and
duct tape? That’s not a life worth living, is
it?”7 That’s useful advice as well for
Homeland Security officials. The vain quest
to “terrorproof” each and every possible tar-
get is making the nation’s capital a monu-
ment to fear. 
Is the astronomical chance that terrorists
will attack a national landmark at the precise
moment of one’s visit worth hours wasted by
every individual before every visit to every park
and museum? Trying to find a handful of ter-
rorists by institutionalizing inconvenience
for millions of Americans would seem to be a
prime example of an unreasonable search.
Instead of sacrificing civil liberties for
unneeded and ineffective homeland security
measures, policymakers should be focusing
on a few key areas that will make a significant
difference in preventing a future terrorist
attack—such as safeguarding nuclear and
chemical facilities.8
Capitol Police
In addition to the Washington, D.C., met-
ropolitan police department, members of
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Congress are also protected by the Capitol
Police. As it has other federal police agencies,
terrorism has provided the Capitol Police
with a golden opportunity to expand their
authority. Within weeks of 9/11, Congress
rushed into place a $600 million security plan
to hire more police officers and give them a
new command center and an upgraded vehi-
cle fleet, among other things.9 Eighteen
months later, Capitol Police chief Terrance
Gainer asked for more money and power,
seeking to expand the force from 1,393 sworn
officers to 1,833 and to more than double the
number of civilian employees (from 227 to
573). Gainer also asked Congress to enlarge
the police force’s jurisdiction to include all of
Washington, D.C., and its suburbs—from
Frederick County, Maryland, to Loudoun
County, Virginia.10
Exercising commendable oversight, Con-
gress did not allow the expanded jurisdiction.
Congressman Jim Moran (D-VA) was a
notable critic. “The Capitol Police chief is over-
reaching, both in the scope of his responsibili-
ties and in his jurisdiction,” Moran said. “It’s
almost as though he’s trying to create his own
army on Capitol Hill.”11 But the 2004 budget
allotted $207 million to cover salaries for more
Capitol Police officers. The force has around
1,600 officers now and is actively recruiting
more.12 When it reaches the 1,800 requested
by Gainer, it will have one officer for every four
members of Congress. When will the force be
considered large enough? When every mem-
ber of Congress has a personal bodyguard? 
As with other federal police agencies, a
worrisome aspect of the Capitol Police force
is that its officers serve the citizenry only
indirectly. In 1992, after a representative was
mugged on Capitol Hill and a congressional
spouse was robbed, Congress expanded the
Capitol Police jurisdiction to include the sur-
rounding neighborhood. Moreover, the
Capitol Police have authority to make arrests
nationwide when accompanying members of
Congress. How many regular citizens, after
becoming crime victims, can order personal
police protection at taxpayer expense? And,
as with other agencies, that level of protec-
tion is approaching the point of absurdity.
William Pickle, the Senate’s sergeant at arms
and chairman of the Capitol Police Board,
says beefing up the police force is necessary
to protect “not only the institution and the
members, but also the officers themselves.”13
So now we need more Capitol Police to pro-
tect the other Capitol Police? 
That enough-is-never-enough mentality is
evident in one of the most unnecessary
restrictions imposed after 9/11: the closing
of the Capitol’s west steps, which afford
access to one of Washington’s most magnifi-
cent views. What possible purpose could that
serve? No one can drive a bomb-laden truck
up those steps. A terrorist with explosives
strapped to his body could not carry enough
ammunition to damage the tremendous
marble edifice. Moreover, the steps naturally
form a progressive barricade. Anyone appear-
ing suspect could be seen climbing the steps
and intercepted long before he reached the
building. 
Fear also drives the massive expansion of
the Capitol’s underground visitors’ center,
which Congress approved after a deranged
gunman opened fire in the Capitol in 1998.
When the idea was bandied about in the early
1990s, construction of the center was estimat-
ed to cost $71 million. But in the wake of the
9/11 attacks, lawmakers added to the plan two
underground escape routes, a tunnel to the
Library of Congress, and underground offices
to operate from in the event of an attack.
Completion of the project has been delayed
until late 2006, and costs may reach $500 mil-
lion—a monstrous overrun resulting from
weak congressional oversight, according to
the Government Accountability Office.14
Secret Service
The Secret Service began protecting presi-
dents unofficially as an outgrowth of its offi-
cial duties. Created in 1865 with the principal
mission of nabbing counterfeiters, the
agency’s task soon expanded to include other
forms of federal fraud. In 1894, when two
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Secret Service agents in Colorado reported
that the suspects they were investigating
made threats against President Grover
Cleveland, the agency’s chief dispatched two
men to protect Cleveland personally.15
When President William McKinley was
assassinated in 1901, Congress again ad-
dressed the problem of how to protect the
president from bodily harm without affording
him royal treatment. Sen. Stephen Mallory (R-
FL) said, “I would object on general principles
that it is antagonistic to our traditions, to our
habits of thought, and to our customs that
the president should surround himself with a
body of Janizarries or a sort of Praetorian
guard and never go anywhere unless he is
accompanied by men in uniform and men
with sabers as is done by the monarchs in the
continent of Europe.”16 The House Judiciary
Committee objected to the proposal that a
cabinet secretary send presidential protectors
“among the people to act under secret orders.
When such laws begin to operate in the
Republic, the liberties of the people will take
wings and fly away.”17 Despite such objec-
tions, in 1906 Congress authorized the Secret
Service to use appropriated funds to cover
temporarily “the protection of the person of
the President of the United States.” That
authorization was subject to annual renewal
until it was made permanent in 1951. The
terms of the debate have shifted dramatically
since Sen. Mallory registered his objection on
the Senate floor in 1901. Indeed, today
Congress hardly even questions the remark-
able expansion of the Secret Service. 
Bush’s first Inauguration Day marked the
first time in history that Americans were not
free to line the streets of Pennsylvania
Avenue. Claiming that protesters posed a
threat to the president, the Secret Service
declared “America’s Main Street” off-limits
and permitted access only through police
checkpoints. When protesters took the mat-
ter to court, Judge Gladys Kessler declined to
order the Secret Service to dismantle its plan.
But she made clear in her ruling that she con-
sidered the proposal an assault on democrat-
ic ideals. “This court has very deep concerns
about the utilization of checkpoints. At no
time in history have citizens been required to
go through checkpoints to exercise their free-
dom to watch their leaders and present their
political views or receive others’ political
views,” Kessler said.18 “[There is] no question
that for a significant number of people, it will
chill their participation, as well as that of
demonstrators.”19
That may have been the point. The
administration evidently has charged the
Secret Service with protecting President Bush
not only from physical harm but from polit-
ical embarrassment as well.20 Whenever the
president makes a public appearance, the
Secret Service directs local police to confine
Bush’s critics to a remote area—ironically
defined as a “free-speech zone”—where they
will go unseen by the president and the
media. Only supporters are allowed proximi-
ty to the president; dissenters who infiltrate
those ranks are subject to arrest.21
Brett Bursey is among those who have
been hauled off in paddy wagons for exercis-
ing their right to free speech. During a presi-
dential visit to Columbia, South Carolina, in
2002, Bursey joined a crowd of Bush sup-
porters and held up a sign reading, “No War
for Oil.” A Secret Service agent told him to
move to the so-called free-speech zone. “I told
her that I was already in a free-speech zone—
the United States of America,” Bursey says,
“and she ordered a local cop to arrest me.”
When he asked what the problem was,
Bursey said the police officer replied, “It’s the
content of your sign that’s the problem.”22
Because South Carolina law says trespass-
ing charges cannot apply to public property,
the official charge against Bursey was subse-
quently dropped. But the Bush administra-
tion was so determined to see Bursey pun-
ished that federal prosecutors brought
charges under a law against “entering a
restricted area around the president of the
United States.” Bursey was convicted and
fined $500, despite the judge’s acknowledge-
ment that Bursey had presented no threat to
the president. So why was it necessary to
bring the full force of the federal government
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down on a harmless protestor? “There has to
be a consequence when people ignore the
directions of the Secret Service,” the prosecu-
tor said.23
It is difficult to account for the way the
Secret Service behaves toward citizens such as
Glenn Givens. Four years ago, as editor of the
student newspaper at the State University of
New York–Stony Brook, Givens wrote a satir-
ical editorial in which he asked Jesus to
“smite” George Bush and MTV host Carson
Daly. Secret Service agents arrived unan-
nounced at the newspaper’s offices where
they questioned Givens extensively and asked
him to submit to a psychological evaluation
and to allow them to search his home and
obtain his medical records. The federal
agents told Givens his editorial was not cov-
ered by free speech rights and threatened to
bring charges against him.24
Those heavy-handed tactics finally drew
criticism from Congress when the Secret
Service moved against a Pulitzer Prize–win-
ning cartoonist, Michael Ramirez. To illus-
trate his opinion that President Bush “is the
target of political assassination because of his
State of the Union address,” Ramirez drew an
editorial cartoon showing Bush being held
hostage with a gun pointed at his head. The
gun is held by a man who is labeled “politics.”
The Secret Service deemed the illustration a
threat to Bush and announced it was investi-
gating “what action, if any, could be taken.”25
In a letter to Secret Service director Ralph
Basham, Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA) said he
was “disappointed” to read of the agency’s
position and said that “the use of federal
power to attempt to influence the work of an
editorial cartoonist for the Los Angeles Times
reflects profoundly bad judgment.”26
Unfortunately, such congressional criti-
cism of the Secret Service is unusual. Indeed,
lawmakers allow the president’s police force
to function with virtually no oversight. The
Secret Service now has a budget of $1.3 bil-
lion, but the agency claims that its expendi-
tures must be classified.27
And who is keeping track of how many
people the Secret Service is protecting? By
law, the agency protects the president, vice
president, president elect, vice president elect,
and their immediate families; former presi-
dents and their spouses (unless the spouse
remarries); former presidents’ children under
the age of 16; visiting heads of foreign gov-
ernments; other distinguished foreign visi-
tors; and major presidential candidates.28 But
nowadays presidents seem to dispense Secret
Service protection as a perk. In one of his last
acts before leaving office, Bill Clinton issued
an executive order prolonging Secret Service
protection for his daughter Chelsea and his
former vice president. Neither would be
assuming an official capacity, nor was either
in particular danger. But Secret Service pro-
tection is the ultimate convenience; pro-
tectees never have to wait in a line. President
Bush has reportedly expanded round-the-
clock Secret Service protection to 20 individ-
uals in the Bush and Cheney families, which
is the largest number ever.29 No one in
Congress wants to challenge the president by
requiring him to make the case that such
expenses are justified. 
In some cases, security measures seem arbi-
trary. Shortly after 9/11, Bush closed Reagan
National Airport to general aviation. The air-
port reopened to commercial traffic, but pri-
vate aviation remains tightly restricted by the
Transportation Security Administration.30
Waivers to land at Reagan airport are now
granted to high-ranking officials, such as gov-
ernors—but only if their pilots undergo federal
security screening and the governor is accom-
panied by sworn law enforcement officers.31
None of those restrictions prevents terrorists
from taking off from open fields or deserted
highways and flying into restricted airspace.
The salient fact is that even if that happens, it
poses no dire threat. A jet plane is a flying
bomb, but a Cessna puttering along at about
100 mph carrying 50 gallons of fuel is not. At
2,500 pounds, the plane weighs less than a Ford
Explorer. When a deranged pilot flew a Cessna
into the White House in 1994, the crash killed
the pilot but barely nicked the building.32
If it were providing serious oversight,
Congress would also question security mea-
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sures that merely serve the convenience of the
Secret Service and the president’s family. One
of the most expensive practices that has devel-
oped in recent years on the pretense of securi-
ty is ferrying the president’s family in Air Force
jets. Hillary Clinton traveled the world at pub-
lic expense with her daughter, planning
“goodwill tours” that always managed to coin-
cide with Chelsea’s school vacations. On the
taxpayers’ nickel, mother and daughter toured
South Asia, Europe, and Africa. Laura Bush
continued the tradition by taking her daugh-
ter Jenna to Paris in 2002, purportedly to
thank our European allies. 
That explanation was hard to believe. A First
Lady can command a platform in Peoria as eas-
ily as she can in Paris. Moreover, her husband
was traveling to Europe later in the month.
Surely, thanking the allies could have waited
until Mrs. Bush caught a ride on Air Force One. 
The costs of Laura Bush’s mother-daugh-
ter vacation are difficult to assess, but consid-
er: Everywhere the Bush women traveled was
visited by advance teams of planners and
Secret Service agents. The White House is
cagey about releasing numbers, but if 10
advance people flew commercial airlines
round-trip from Washington to Paris to
Budapest to Prague, the airfare would have
totaled about $21,000. More likely, the team
spent at least 10 times more by flying a mili-
tary jet, such as the C-32, which costs $10,000
an hour to operate (according to the Air
Force; nonmilitary sources estimate the cost
as at least three times higher). The average per
diem allotted by the State Department for
those cities was $226; so over 14 days, a team
of 10 would run up a tab of $31,640.33
If Mrs. Bush and Jenna also traveled on an
Air Force C-32, then taxpayers shelled out
another $220,000 for the plane to fly to
Europe and return Jenna home after the First
Lady joined her husband.34 And that round-
trip expense was matched or exceeded by the
cargo plane carrying their motorcade vehi-
cles. The Bush women stayed with friends
now enjoying ambassadorships, but the cost
of feeding and sheltering their entourage
went on the taxpayers’ tab. Mrs. Bush’s office
wouldn’t say how many people accompanied
her. Fifty is a guess. If so, that was another
$158,200 in per diems.35 All told, taxpayers
may have spent more than $800,000 for Mrs.
Bush to enjoy a nine-day vacation with her
daughter.36 Legislators ought to be asking
questions about such expenses, but their
silence is deafening.
Certainly, no one argues that it is unim-
portant to protect the president’s wife and
daughters. But can the Secret Service make
the case that the women would be uniquely
endangered on a commercial airplane or a
private jet, any more than they are in restau-
rants or bars or college classrooms? 
Transportation Security 
Administration
The Transportation Security Administration
was created two months after the September 11
attacks. Prior to 9/11, private commercial firms
screened passengers and luggage. Congress cre-
ated the TSA so that all airport security checkers
would be federal employees. 
In 2002 the TSA announced a major initia-
tive called the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System. The current system of
passenger screening is administered by the air-
lines—the airlines essentially check names
against a government “watch list” and select
passengers for extra screening, or rejection in
the event of a match. CAPPS II would require
prospective travelers to give their full name,
date of birth, address, and home telephone
number when making a flight reservation.
That information will be sent to the TSA,
where government computers will comb data-
bases and build a file on the individual. Secret
algorithms will assess the passenger’s threat
level and encrypt it on the airline ticket.37
Travelers bearing green labels will pass
through regular security; those rated yellow
will be scrutinized. Passengers assigned red—
or “no-fly status”—will be barred from board-
ing planes. 
CAPPS II has proved to be a very unpopu-
lar proposal because of the privacy intrusions
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it entails. Airlines that cooperated with the
government in designing CAPPS II now face
boycotts and lawsuits from customers.38 But
instead of changing its approach, the TSA
has simply renamed the program (it is now
called “Secure Flight”) and says it will force
the airlines to comply. 
And for what supposed gain will air travelers
forfeit their privacy? Among the many draw-
backs of CAPPS II is that it almost certainly will
not work. Planners of the September 11 attacks
plainly understood how to avoid detection by
the present system, CAPPS I. The terrorists took
practice runs on the flights they would hijack, to
be sure the computer didn’t flag them. To crack
the code on CAPPS II, terrorists need only test-
book flights and see who among them rates a
“low risk.”
The TSA screeners have flagged members
of Congress as suspects who ought to be
denied access to commercial aircraft, searched,
and questioned by law enforcement. Sen.
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Rep. John Lewis
(D-GA) have both experienced problems at air-
ports because their names matched names on
secret “no fly” lists.39 Of course, members of
Congress can cut through the bureaucracy’s
red tape so that the problem will not recur, but
ordinary citizens are stuck. For example, one
family has had to resort to a special seating
arrangement when they fly together. Because
the father’s name matches one on the watch
list, he now takes a seat that is far away from
his wife and children. He does that so his
daughters will not see the recurring question-
ing, searches, and demands for identification
papers.40
Yet the real menace of CAPPS II is not that
it won’t work but that it will work in unto-
ward ways. Once air travel is considered a
privilege, the government can revoke it at
will. Inevitably, the “privilege” to fly—like the
“privilege” to drive—will become a tool for
government social engineering schemes.
Consider how many behaviors unrelated to
driving are punished by rescinding that priv-
ilege. In nearly half the states, drivers’ licens-
es are suspended for not paying child sup-
port. Californians can lose their right to drive
for consorting with prostitutes, nonfelony
violations of the Fish and Game Code, grow-
ing peyote, playing sound equipment on
public transportation, or beating a vending
machine.41 Florida reserves the right to
revoke a driver’s license for any “immoral act
in which a motor vehicle was used.”42 In sev-
eral states, drivers’ licenses can be revoked as
a penalty for bicycling infractions.43
Does anyone believe that the TSA will not
similarly expand its reach? Before CAPPS II is
even fully in place, its dragnet has already
widened. TSA officials announced that the
program also will snare individuals with out-
standing warrants.44 Undoubtedly, the agency
intends to add other ranks of miscreants to
that list. The TSA initially said the program
would flag “a statistically infinitesimal num-
ber” of passengers. Now, it predicts that 5 per-
cent of travelers will be labeled red or yellow.
Unless 1 of every 20 passengers is a terrorist,
the system is either grossly inefficient or its
qualifiers of “high risk” are alarmingly broad.
The latter is suggested by many of the inci-
dents that have been reported in recent years.
Travelers now face stiff penalties for merely
indicating annoyance over the arbitrary
enforcement of vague regulations.45
• In 2002 a member of the U.S. boomerang
team was arrested and charged with
breach of the peace. Like many business
travelers who are frustrated by inconsis-
tent policies about what may be included
in carry-on baggage, this young woman
started to argue with a police officer who
said her boomerangs could not be
brought into the main cabin. The officer
was not interested in knowing about how
many times she had flown with them
before, or how boomerangs are less
threatening than tennis rackets, which
apparently are allowed on airplanes.46
• TSA agents held an entire cabin of a jet-
liner at gunpoint for a half hour in
response to a perceived threat. Upon
landing, the agents arrested a retired
Army physician and detained him for
several hours before releasing him with-
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out any charges. The TSA agents made
the arrest because the physician was
apparently observing the agents “too
closely.” The TSA initially denied any
wrongdoing, but after a lawsuit was filed,
it agreed to pay $50,000 to the falsely
arrested physician, issued a formal apolo-
gy, and agreed to revise its training pro-
gram. After the lawsuit was filed, civil
rights lawyers discovered that one of the
TSA agents involved had sought employ-
ment with the Philadelphia police and
fire departments but had been rejected
because of his performance on a psycho-
logical exam.47
• When Patti LuPone, the singer and
actress, was told to remove her clothing
at an airport security checkpoint, she
removed her jacket, belt, and shoes. But
when the screener said, “Now take off
your shirt,” LuPone objected. Screeners
barred LuPone from her flight for her
persistent objections.48
• When a French woman became exasper-
ated by a screener’s repeated “wanding”
of her chest, she took a step back and
removed her sweater and bra to prove
she had nothing to hide and to finally
end the search. The police placed the 57-
year-old tourist under arrest for “disor-
derly conduct.” Prosecutors initially
pursued the felony charge but dropped
it after a public outcry.49
• Federal agents charged Gurdeep Wander,
a 48-year-old American citizen, with
“intimidating a flight attendant” because
he used a washroom too long. Shortly
after takeoff, Wander went to use the
bathroom. After 10 minutes, Wander was
asked to return to his seat. He responded
that he needed a few minutes to finish
shaving. Because the flight attendant felt
“intimidated” by his stubbornness,
Wander was arrested when the plane
landed. Although no one believes that
Wander was doing anything other than
shaving, federal prosecutors believed that
a felony charge was warranted.50
• Eighty-year-old Fred Hubbell, tired and
upset after facing several airport security
checkpoints, was arrested after making a
sarcastic remark to security screeners.
When Hubbell, a World War II veteran,
saw an agent poking through his wallet,
he said, “You better look at it real good;
there may be a rifle in there.” Dana
Cosgrove, head of the airport security
force, explained that because people in
the vicinity heard the word “rifle,” an
arrest was appropriate. A state police
sergeant explained that serious charges
were reserved for travelers who become
“obnoxious or irate,” but since Hubbell
simply made a remark, a $78 fine would
be appropriate.51
Are legislators so afraid of appearing soft on
terrorism that they will not rein in such obvi-
ous abuses? 
Once airlines are forced to relinquish pas-
senger data to the government, citizens will
have no idea what information is collected,
who has access to it, or how else it might be
used, because the TSA says revealing that
knowledge would compromise security. The
agency’s promise that it will strictly limit use of
the data is not much of an assurance. History
teaches that government functions rarely
remain tethered to their original purposes.52
And the TSA has misled both Congress and
the press about its past activities. In November
2003 Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) asked TSA
chief admiral James Loy whether any of his
contractors had used any real-world data for
testing purposes. In a sworn written response,
Loy said: “No. TSA has not used any (passen-
ger) data to test any of the functions of CAPPS
II.”53 In 2004 the TSA confirmed rumors that
its contractors had indeed acquired and tested
sensitive passenger data.54
The crucial step is checking passengers’
names against terrorist watch lists—and air-
lines can perform that role as ably as the gov-
ernment can. CAPPS II will only inconven-
ience the innocent while invading every air
traveler’s privacy.55 And by allowing the federal
government to create files on honest citizens, it
will set a dangerous precedent. 
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Conclusion
In October 2001 Osama bin Laden boasted
that terrorist attacks would achieve their pur-
pose: “I tell you, freedom and human rights in
America are doomed. The United States gov-
ernment will lead the American people into an
unbearable hell and a choking life.”56 Life in
the United States remains exceptionally good
and is a far cry from bin Laden’s “unbearable
hell.” But some changes in recent years are
worrisome. Long lines, searches, and identifi-
cation requirements are becoming routine.
Unwarranted intrusion and inconvenience are
becoming the American way of life.
It is naive to believe, as some do, that the
“pendulum will swing back toward liberty”
when the threat of terrorism wanes. The con-
cept of what it means to be free can be lost in
one generation. Unless reason soon prevails,
today’s children will grow up accustomed to
being routinely stopped and searched. How
can they learn to cherish freedoms they have
never known? To counter the push for
diminishing liberty, it is necessary to counter
the specious arguments behind it. The most
common argument is that 9/11 “changed
everything.” But life changed forever with the
invention of gunpowder, germ warfare, and
the atomic bomb. History is, in large part, the
story of aggression’s innovation. Restricting
freedom cannot stop or turn back hostility’s
advancement. 
Another canard used to justify excessive
security at public landmarks is that police are
merely “protecting the symbols of democra-
cy.” But the symbol of democracy is an open
society, not an ominous police presence.
Installing cameras in monuments, surround-
ing them with unsightly fences, and limiting
citizens’ access doesn’t protect the symbols of
democracy, it desecrates them. 
Freedom is a fragile thing; stone and steel
are not. The Statue of Liberty has been taken
over by Puerto Rican nationalists, dissident
Iranians, the Attica Brigade, and the Vietnam
Veterans against the War (twice).57 The Black
Liberation Front attempted to blow up the
statue in 1964.58 In 1980 a bomber was suc-
cessful—but the damage to the statue was
minimal.59 Engineers have testified that the
Washington Monument, with its 15-foot-
thick walls, is virtually immune to destruc-
tion from hand-carried explosives.60 Bombs
have detonated in the Capitol three times
since 1915, with no injuries or structural ca-
tastrophe.61 Terrorists have already hit our
national monuments. The difference is that
after those earlier attacks, the government
did not respond with hysteria.
The war against terrorism is in large part a
war against fear. To win this war, three things
are critically needed. First, all Americans
must accept the reality that our society will
never be able to afford an environment that is
totally free from the risk of terrorist attacks.
Nor would most Americans want to live with
the restrictions that such a risk-free environ-
ment would demand. Thus, policymakers
should resist the temptation to enact a
hodgepodge of hastily assembled initiatives
in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist
incident.62
Second, policymakers should employ
cost-benefit analyses when choosing among
the policy proposals that will substantially
reduce the threat of terrorism. As economist
Robert W. Hahn has observed, “Improving
security is important, but we need to assess
the cost and effectiveness of each measure
before spending billions of taxpayers’ dollars
on security-enhancing measures.”63 Even
though it will not always be possible to pre-
cisely quantify estimates in the homeland
security context, it would be a mistake to
abandon the exercise altogether. Cost-benefit
analyses “offer the foundation of a principled
approach for making difficult decisions.”64
The third essential is for the nation’s lead-
ers to be willing to demonstrate courage.
Freedom prevailed in other times of national
attack because leaders did not succumb to
fear. When John F. Kennedy was assassinated
in 1963 during the iciest days of the Cold
War, many in his administration initially
feared the murder was the start of a coup.65 If
so, his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, was the
10
All Americans
must accept the
reality that our
society will never
be able to afford
an environment
that is totally free
from the risk of
terrorist attacks. 
next obvious target. Yet when Kennedy’s
widow announced her intention to walk the
several blocks from the White House to her
husband’s funeral, Johnson helped lead the
procession that marched through the streets
of downtown Washington.66
After winning wars against the empires of
Great Britain, Japan, and the Soviet Union, will
Americans now lose their freedom to some
zealots? “Terrorism succeeds,” said the late sen-
ator Patrick Moynihan, “when people become
terrified.”67 Sadly, such success looms—unless
American policymakers begin defending free-
dom rather than pandering to fears. 
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